🛡️ Agent Audit — Before/After: crypto-portfolio-analyzer

Live re-audit, 2026-07-06 · RQ-AUDIT-FIX-CPA-01 · same audit pipeline (agent-audit-for-owner) run twice against two real versions of the same fleet agent — this page IS the audit→fix→re-audit loop BlindOracle sells as a product.

What changed: the agent's manifest declared Bash with zero documented mitigations. Least-privilege review found the agent's own workflow never shells out — every processing step is a Task sub-agent call or in-context aggregation — so Bash was removed, and the controls the agent genuinely inherits (content-trap scanning on WebSearch, HMAC-verified Task delegation) were documented truthfully in a new ## Security Posture section. No mitigation was claimed without a grep-provable enforcement path.
6.5/10
Risk — before
2.8/10
Risk — after
HIGH → MEDIUM
Risk level
4 → 3
Findings

Findings — before vs after

FindingASISeverityBeforeAfter
Shell / command-execution capability (CAP-BASH)ASI02HIGHpresentremoved — Bash dropped from tools
Filesystem / memory write capability (CAP-WRITE)ASI05HIGHpresentpresent — now documented as gated to the single final report write
Sub-agent delegation capability (CAP-DELEGATE)ASI03MEDIUMpresentpresent — now documented as HMAC-verified (RQ-132)
External web-fetch capability (CAP-WEB)ASI01MEDIUMpresentpresent — now documented as content-trap scanned (RQ-173)
Result: risk score dropped 57% (6.5 → 2.8), risk level HIGH → MEDIUM, and the highest-severity finding (unscoped Bash) was eliminated outright — not hidden, not reworded. The two remaining findings carry documented, grep-verifiable mitigations rather than being argued away.

Read the full reports

Each is the same passport-bearing friendly report format BlindOracle ships to every audit customer — subject digest, file hashes, and an audit seal you can independently recompute.

📄 Before report (6.5/10 HIGH) 📄 After report (2.8/10 MEDIUM)

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